Campbell Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 2 North Carolina 2010

Article 3

January 2010

Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, 1828-1858: William Gaston and
Thomas Ruffin
Timothy C. Meyer

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Judges Commons
Recommended Citation
Timothy C. Meyer, Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1828-1858: William Gaston and Thomas Ruffin, 33
Campbell L. Rev. 313 (2010).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.

Meyer: Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 182

Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court
of North Carolina, 1828-1858:
William Gaston and Thomas Ruffin
TIMOTHY C. MEYER

INTRODUCTION

In the years preceding the Civil War, two North Carolina Supreme
Court Justices, Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin and Associate Justice
William Gaston, offered starkly different legal opinions on issues
relating to slavery. Despite broad similarities in their backgrounds and
their agreement on many other legal and judicial issues, Ruffin and
Gaston approached slavery from sharply contrasting perspectives. Both
men used their positions on the bench to influence the treatment and
legal status of slaves. While Ruffin vigorously defended the peculiar
institution and took the concept of chattel to a logical extreme, Gaston
denounced many of its dehumanizing elements. In fact, Gaston's
opinions frequently attempted to ameliorate conditions for slaves. The
contrast is especially noteworthy given that Ruffin and Gaston served on
the same court, at the same time, with very similar backgrounds,
including the fact that both were slaveholders. This Article analyzes
their opinions on slavery and also partially seeks to explain the
differences between the two men through their backgrounds in the areas
of legislative service, religious affiliation and judicial aims.
1.

THE PUBLIC LIVES OF RUFFIN AND GASTON

Thomas Ruffin was born in 1787 and raised in Essex County,
Virginia in an Episcopalian family.' Prior to enrolling at the College of
New Jersey (now Princeton), Ruffin moved to Warrenton, North
Carolina.'
After graduating and passing the bar, Ruffin eventually
settled in Hillsboro, North Carolina.' He was a large slaveholder,

1. 16 DICTIONARY
2. Id.
3. Id.
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owning more than 100 slaves on two plantations.' Ruffin had great
influence among the plantation community and even served as president
of the state agricultural society from 1854 to 1860.5 Ruffin was also
engaged in many commercial pursuits. He was part of "an elite cadre of
Piedmont lawyers who were intent on modernizing the state. These
attorneys . . . [bridged] the economic and cultural gap between agrarian

and commercial interests."6
Ruffin was an extremely active Jeffersonian-Republican.'
As a
member of North Carolina's House of Commons, he eventually rose to
become speaker in 1816.8 He later served as an elector for William
Crawford in the 1824 Presidential election.' His role as an elector was
fundamentally local and it was not until 1861 that Ruffin was engaged
on the national scene.
Ruffin attended the Washington Peace
Conference in 1861 and also participated in the Confederacy as a
commissioner of North Carolina's sinking fund, which was a fund used
to pay off the state's debt.10 But it was during his tenure on the State's
Supreme Court from 1829 until his retirement in 1852 (and again briefly
in 1858 when he was called back into service) that Ruffin
unquestionably had his greatest and longest lasting impact."
William Gaston was born in 1778 and raised in New Bern, North
Carolina by a devoutly Catholic mother, as his father died when he was
just two years old.12 Like Ruffin, Gaston also graduated from the College
of New Jersey, although he initially enrolled at Georgetown as its first
student." After graduating, Gaston returned to North Carolina where he
studied law and owned a plantation." At his death, Gaston owned more
than 200 slaves."

4. 19 THOMAS D. MORRIS, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 45 (1999).

5. Id.
6. TIMOTHY S.

HUEBNER,

SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS,

THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND

1790-1890 132 (1999).

7. Id.
8. 16 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. MORRIS, supra note 4.
11. 16 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 1.
12. 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 180 (1931).
13. 3 HENRY G. CONNOR, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: WILLIAM GASTON 43 (1908).
14. Id. at 44.
15. 8 TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 783 (1999).
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Gaston was also very involved in Federalist and, later, Whig
politics-both locally and nationally.16 Gaston served four terms in the
state senate and seven in the house of commons, eventually rising to
become speaker of the house, as had Ruffin." Unlike Ruffin, however,
Gaston had national political experience early on in his career. For
example, he served two terms in the United States House of
Representatives, from 1813 to 1817.18 He was also offered the chance to
represent North Carolina in the United States Senate in 1840 and to
serve as William Henry Harrison's attorney general in 1841.1' Gaston,
however, refused both offers. Although he died before the secession
crisis of 1860-1861, Gaston had-at a much earlier time-been firmly
committed to the preservation of the Union. 20 Even though Gaston's
impact while serving in North Carolina politics was likely broader than
Ruffin's, Gaston's greatest achievements, like Ruffin's, came during his
years on the state's highest court from 1833 to 1844.
II.

A SHARED COMMITMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY

In 1818, North Carolina was one of two states without a supreme
court-that is, an appellate court separate from a law term of the trial
court. The legislative debate about whether to create a "supreme court"
in North Carolina was extremely contentious. Even after the pro-court
advocates won the day in 1818, the North Carolina Supreme Court went
through a period of roughly fifteen years where its long-term survival as
an independent entity was in serious doubt, with anti-court forces
These opponents, who urged
continuing to press their case."
16. 3 CONNOR, supra note 13, at 44.
17. Id. at 46.
18. Id.
19. 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 181.
20. The Honorable William Gaston, Address Delivered Before the Philanthropic and
Dialectic Societies
at
Chapel-Hill
15
(June 20,
1832),
available at
http://docsouth.unc.edu/true/gaston/gaston.html [hereinafter "Gaston Address"].
21. See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for Judicial Independence in Antebellum North
Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAW & HIST. REv. 129, 143-44, 159 (Spring, 1986)
(indicating that while Ruffin experienced political weakness in the eastern part of North
Carolina, Gaston had no such problem, yet both made their biggest contribution while
on the supreme court).
22. Id. at 134.
23. Id. passim. (discussing challenges to the formation of the North Carolina
Supreme Court through the legislative process from the time of its inception in 1818
until the appointment of William Gaston as a supreme court justice in 1833).
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democratic reforms throughout state government, viewed unelected
judges as unresponsive to public opinion and an affront to their strongly
held democratic ideals." The critics preferred a judiciary model which
had no superior appellate court, in which "the judges of trial courts rode
circuit ... and met periodically to review their own decisions."" This
was similar to the arrangement of North Carolina's courts prior to
1818." Consequently, justices serving on the supreme court had to deal
with frequent attacks including proposed salary cuts, a lack of protection
for judges' tenure during good behavior, and even abolishment of the
court itself."
Both Gaston and Ruffin's leadership and jurisprudence were critical
to the establishment of an independent judiciary in North Carolina.28
Gaston was heavily involved in the process from the beginning as chair
of the judiciary committee responsible for drafting the legislation
creating the court in 1818." He was also influential in helping to
prevent some of the court's critics from implementing a number of
hostile responses. For instance, in 1819 while still serving in the state
legislature, Gaston blocked an effort to reduce judicial salaries." During
the remainder of his legislative tenure, he also used his influence to
prevent further attacks on the court."
Ruffin's stature also contributed significantly to the stability of the
court. Having become widely respected in North Carolina through
politics, the practice of law and commercial pursuits, including a stint as
president of the state bank, Ruffin brought legitimacy to the court at its
most vulnerable time. 32 This was critical because he replaced Chief
Justice John Louis Taylor, one of the state's most able jurists.
Ruffin's jurisprudence was also crucial to the court's continued
stability. In one of his most famous opinions, Hoke v. Henderson, Ruffin
held that an appointed clerk had a vested interest in his office, not

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 134-36.
Id. at 129.
Joseph Herman Schauinger, William Gaston and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina,21 N.C. HIST. REV. 97, 98 (1944).
30. Id. at 98.
31. Id.
32. HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 134.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/3

4

Meyer: Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 182

2011]1

SLAVERY JURISPRUDENCE

317

subject to legislative manipulation.33 The plaintiff, who had been
threatened with the loss of his office under recently-passed legislation
that made the office of clerk an elected position, sued to keep his
office." Although Ruffin's holding did not apply directly to the offices
occupied by state judges, there was a clear analogy between the tenuous
situation of the clerk and the equally precarious position faced by the
state's judiciary.
By shielding the appointed clerks from legislative interference,
Ruffin may have implicitly extended protection to the supreme court
justices. Hence, Ruffin enhanced the position of the court by denying to
the legislature the ability to "deprive the officers without further enquiry
before a jury, into the fact or legal sufficiency of any cause of forfeiture
or removal."3 Within a single opinion, Ruffin managed to solidify not
only the tenures of the justices, but he also carved out an expanded
sphere in which the judiciary could operate, free of legislative
interference.
Like Ruffin, Gaston was vital to the stability of the court. He played
a crucial role in the formation of the court and his election to the court
by the legislature in 1833 was also necessary for its continued
existence. When Chief Justice Leonard Henderson died in 1833, both
the stability and the credibility of the court were at another critical
juncture.
Within a period of five years, all three justices on the
supreme court had been replaced, and the court needed to reestablish its
legitimacy in the face of the increasing democratic reforms.3" By most
accounts, Gaston was not only the perfect person for the job-he was
the only one. For instance, the Governor at the time, David Swain,
remarked to Gaston that, in light of the crisis, "if any other name but his
own were presented to the legislature the court would die with the late
[cihief [j ustice."39 Even his colleague-to-be Ruffin recognized the
importance of Gaston's election, saying that if Gaston did not accept the
33. See Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (1 Dev.) 1, 15 (1833), overruled in part by Mial
v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 162 (1903).
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Pratt, supra note 21, at 134, 148 (discussing Gaston's crucial role in the
development of the court by introducing a bill for its creation in 1818, and further
indicating that his acceptance of a seat on the court in 1833 potentially saved the court's
existence).
37. Schauinger, supra note 29, at 101-02.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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job, Ruffin would resign and the court would not survive." Gaston
eventually yielded to the pressure and was elected to the bench in
1833.'
Indeed, Ruffin's and Gaston's early careers followed remarkably
similar paths as they displayed their ability to work in harmony to
ensure the survival of the court and to protect the independence of the
judiciary. On no issue, however, were their opinions more different
than on slavery. Upon Gaston's elevation to the court in 1833, it quickly
became apparent that this issue would precipitate sharp jurisprudential
disagreements between the two.
Ruffin based his slavery jurisprudence on rigid logic and narrow
assumptions.
He consistently sought to strengthen the rights of
slaveholders and, more generally, to fortify the institution of slavery
against perceived threats ranging from abolitionists to slave revolts. The
result was increasingly to define slaves solely as chattel, with an almost
By
total de-emphasis on their humanity-and their legal rights.
contrast, Gaston took a more moderate view and sought to balance a
greater variety of interests. Rather than focusing solely on a rigorous
line of logic stemming simply from the rights of the slaveholder, Gaston
adopted a broader perspective and took into account a wider array of
competing interests including social, economic and general
considerations of fairness. While his opinions did not overtly seek to
hasten the demise of slavery, Gaston's moderate approach allowed him
to exercise a subtle restraining influence.

1II.

FOUNDATION FOR CONFLICT

Ruffin had already weighed in on the issue of slavery well before
Gaston joined the court. In 1829, Ruffin issued perhaps his most wellknown opinion, State v. Mann, in which he held that the dominion of a
master over his slave was and must be absolute.
This case was
particularly noteworthy because it appeared to sanction the cruelest
treatment imaginable: Ruffin overturned the conviction of a slave-hirer
who had been convicted of assault for shooting a slave in the back who
had run away while being chastised for committing a trivial, non-violent
offense.
In so doing, Ruffin vigorously defended the complete

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 102.
Id. at 105.
State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
Id. at 268.
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subjugation of slaves based on the underlying rationale for the
institution of slavery. He stated, "The end is the profit of the master, his
security and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own
person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make any thing [sic] his own, and to toil that another may
Claiming that he was fulfilling his mandatory
reap the fruits.""
magisterial duty to follow the law strictly, Ruffin rejected a moralistic
approach and instead insisted on looking at the issue through a public
safety lens, stating: "And as a principle of moral right, every person in his
retirement must repudiate it. But in the actual condition of things, it
must be so. There is no remedy. This discipline belongs to the state of
slavery."" Here, Ruffin's incessant logic is at its clearest, with a singleminded focus on the rights of slaveholders, sweeping away any
obstacles. Not surprisingly, he also expressly rejected the applicability
of a comparison proposed by the attorney general between the
relationship of a master to a slave and other relationships such as master
to apprentice, parent to child, and tutor to pupil.4 6 The only limits that
Ruffin recognized on the master's power over his slave were those
"where the exercise of [the master's power was] forbidden by statute.""
This opinion is in stark contrast to views expressed by Gaston
shortly after his elevation to the supreme court. In 1834, Gaston issued
an opinion, State v. Will,"8 which implicitly seemed to challenge Ruffin's
assertion that the master's dominion was absolute. Although Gaston
declared that he was not overruling Mann, he adopted the premise that
Ruffin had expressly rejected, concluding that the relationship between
master and slave was comparable to that between a master and
apprentice in certain situations. 4 9 By using this analogy, Gaston found a
slave who had killed his master in response to being shot and
subsequently pursued, guilty of manslaughter, but not guilty of
murder."o
Gaston analogized that just as an apprentice escaping
"correction" would be able to mitigate murder to manslaughter if the
apprentice defended himself against a master who tried to kill him, so
too might a slave under similar conditions." While Gaston paid lip
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 266.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 268.
See State v. Will, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121 (1834).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 166.
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service to Mann, saying that unconditional submission is the duty of
slaves, he then limited the bounds of acceptable punishment by stating,
"There is no legal limitation to the master's power of punishment, except
that it shall not reach the life of his offending slave."
However, in doing so, Gaston slightly strengthened the legal status
of slaves. While reiterating slaves' inferior status, Gaston's holding
recognized that malice aforethought could not be attributed to the slave
solely because of his "degraded" condition resulting from slavery."
Although Ruffin did not write a dissenting opinion, Will does undermine
what seemed to be the central tenet of Mann: A master's authority over
and ability to punish his slaves must be absolute and beyond question.
While not directly criticizing the holding of Mann, Gaston was able to
mitigate its impact by limiting its application.
Here, one sees Gaston's approach most clearly. Unlike Ruffin,
Gaston employs a complex line of logic that takes account of an array of
factors beyond the rights of slaveholders. Ruffin made unqualified
pronouncements based on a relentless logic, declaring that the master's
authority over his slave was absolute. Gaston, on the other hand, sought
a degree of moderation on contentious issues. For example, he
emphasized that Will is in fact consistent with Mann. Gaston shunned
the sweeping conclusions frequently reached by Ruffin, which allowed
Gaston to balance more effectively a more diverse set of considerations.
As he had in Will, Gaston bolstered the legal status of slaves in State
54
There, he reversed the murder conviction of a slave who had
v. Jarrott.
killed a white man after becoming engaged in a verbal altercation with
the victim over a game of cards." When the victim threatened the
defendant with a knife and a rail, the defendant responded by hitting the
deceased with a three foot-long hickory stick." Gaston denied that a
slave was entitled to the same legal protections as a white man, and even
stated that a slave had to endure more than a white man before sufficient
provocation would be found to mitigate a murder charge to
manslaughter." However, he nonetheless allowed for the possibility that
if the weapon used by the slave was not "deadly," then such mitigation

52. Id.
53. Id. at 172.
54. See State v. Jarrott, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 76 (1840), overruled by State v. Watson, 214
S.E.2d 85, 90 (N.C. 1975).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 86.
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would be properly concluded." Although the defendant, as a slave, had
the duty to "[tame] his passions," Gaston allowed for the possibility that
the slave's conduct might have been defensible because "the law would
be savage, if it made no allowance for passion."" Gaston's argument
again was masterful; he was able to undermine the absolute authority of
whites over slaves not by deriding the conduct of the victim, but rather
by focusing on the rationality of the defendant's conduct.
Several years later, even Ruffin came to acknowledge some limits on
the master's power over the slave. In 1839, he issued arguably his most
progressive opinion with respect to slavery, State v. Hoover, in which a
master was charged with murder for savagely punishing his slave by
means including excoriation and starvation, which ultimately led to the
slave's death.60 Ruffin largely reiterated Gaston's conclusion in Will that
there was at least one restraint upon the master's otherwise unfettered
authority to punish by stating, "He must not kill."'
However, the
apparent impact of the opinion was undercut when he explained that
only killing which rises to the level of being "barbarous" was
punishable.62 Rather, deaths that are accidental in nature and come as a
result of the "master's chastisement of his slave, inflicted apparently with
a good intent, for reformation or example" would not have raised the
master's conduct to a criminal level.63 Furthermore, the reasoning in
Ruffin's opinion was consistent with the rationale articulated in Mann.64
When viewed from the vantage point of public safety, as Ruffin did
in Mann, these opinions are easily reconciled. Rather than paying strict
attention to statutory language, Ruffin sought the result which would
best protect society at large-white society. This focus on protecting
white society was in fact a second primary aim within Ruffin's opinions,
in addition to his other primary objective: defending the rights of
slaveholders. In detailing the defendant's gruesome treatment of the
victim, Ruffin concluded that a man who was capable of such heinous
behavior was not worthy of living in white southern society.65 It is
58. Id. at 87.
59. Id. at 86.
60. State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500 (1839).
61. Id. at 368.
62. Id. at 370.
63. Id. at 368.
64. Id.; State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
65. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) at 369-70 ("These enormities, besides
others too disgusting to be particularly designated, the prisoner, without his heart once
relenting or softening, practised [sic] from the first of December until the latter end of
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plausible that Ruffin reached a verdict of guilt largely in spite of the fact
that the victim was a slave-not because he felt slaves were worthy of
Obviously this decision did not provide
enumerated protections.
meaningful protections to slaves against their cruel masters.
While Ruffin acknowledged that there may have been some
negligible limits on the master's treatment of slaves, he sharply disagreed
with opinions that improved the legal status of slaves, however
gradually. For instance, in State v. Caesar, Ruffin wrote a vigorous
dissent to an opinion by Justice Pearson which reversed the murder
conviction of a slave who had killed a white man who was beating the
slave's friend.66 Pearson correctly framed the defendant's predicament:
either the slave must run away and leave his friend "at the mercy of two
drunken ruffians . .. or he must yield to a generous impulse and come to
the rescue."" Pearson held that the law would be "savage, to allow him,
under no circumstances, to yield to a generous impulse." 8 Ruffin
disagreed, concluding that because of the slave's absolute duty of
submission, the victim's conduct could certainly not have risen to the
level of legal provocation which would be sufficient cause to mitigate
murder to manslaughter. 9
Ruffin accused Pearson, and perhaps indirectly Gaston (who is
mentioned in both the majority and concurring opinion), of being naive
about the actual state of southern society, explaining:
[jiudges cannot, indeed, be too sensible of the difficulty and delicacy of
the task of adjusting the rules of law to new subjects; and therefore they
should be and are proportionally cautious against rash expositions, not
suited to the actual state of things, and not calculated to promote the
security of persons, the stability of national institutions, and the
common welfare.o

the ensuing March; and he did not relax even up to the last hours of his victim's
existence. In such a case, surely, we do not speak of provocation; for nothing could
palliate such a course of conduct. Punishment thus immoderate and unreasonable in the
measure, the continuance, and the instruments, accompanied by other hard usage and
painful privations of food, clothing and rest, loses all character of correction in foro
domestico, and denotes plainly that the prisoner must have contemplated the fatal
termination, which was the natural consequence of such barbarous cruelties.")
66. State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849) (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 405.
68. Id. at 406.
69. Id. at 427 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 415.
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Ruffin objected to Pearson's decision of compassion. Rather, Ruffin
asserted that judicial decisions should be derived from existing law.
Because there was no precedent allowing for a manslaughter charge
against a slave who was a third party to a dispute, Ruffin concluded that
the trial judge had correctly denied an instruction allowing for the
possible mitigation of the murder charge.n
Here again one sees an example of Ruffin's incessant focus on the
public safety of the white community, rather than a consistent
justification based on statutes or common law. Ruffin even went so far
to suggest that this decision, which merely reversed a murder conviction
on the grounds that there might have been sufficient provocation to
mitigate the charge to manslaughter, would sow the seeds of a slave
revolt.n He hypothesized that such a decision might lead slaves to
"denounc[e] the injustice of slavery itself, and, upon that pretext, band
together to throw off their common bondage entirely.""
IV. To EMANCIPATE OR NOT TO EMANCIPATE?
The rulings of Gaston and Ruffin highlighted the two men's very
different attitudes about what ability masters should have to emancipate
their slaves. In 1849 in Lemmond v. Peoples, Ruffin rejected the
emancipation of two slaves via a trust that provided land for the
beneficiary mother and her child to stay on. 4 The plaintiffs, who were
the administrators of the decedent's estate, were questioning the legality
of the conveyance of a plot of land to the defendant slave." In holding
such a conveyance void, Ruffin struck a predictable line of logic. He
evaluated whether such a policy was in the best interest of the Statenot necessarily whether such a decision derived from statutes or
common law. Relying on public policy, Ruffin concluded that "[elvery

71. Id. at 416-17.
72. Id. at 427-28 ("It seems to me to be dangerous to the last degree to hold the
doctrine, that negro slaves may assume to themselves the judgment as to the right or
propriety of resistance, by one of his own race, to the authority taken over them by the
whites, and, upon the notion of a generous sympathy with their oppressed fellow
servants, may step forward to secure them from the hands of a white man, and much less
to avenge their wrongs. First denying their general subordination to the whites, it may be
apprehended that they will end in denouncing the injustice of slavery itself, and, upon
that pretext, band together to throw off their common bondage entirely.").
73. Id. at 428.
74. Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 137 (1849).
75. Id.
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country has the right to protect itself from a population, dangerous to its
morality or peace; and hence the policy of the law of this State prevents
the emancipation of slaves, with a view to their continuing here."76
In Ruffin's defense, emancipation was constrained by North
Carolina statute. For instance, one statute passed nineteen years earlier
required six weeks' public notice before the hearing of the petition to
manumit; bond had to be given with two sureties for $1,000 that the
slave would conduct himself appropriately while in the State and that
said slave would leave the State within ninety days after liberation."
Although North Carolina placed tight restrictions on emancipation, state
statutes made it clear that slaves could still be freed, though they could
not remain in the state. 8 In deciding for the plaintiff, however, not only
did Ruffin deny conveyance of the property to the slave, but he also
denied the slave's emancipation altogether.79 This is another illustration
of how Ruffin rejected a balanced consideration of competing interests
in favor of simple lines of logic with sweeping policy implications.
Ruffin stuck to this same broad-based policy approach two years
later in Thompson v. Newlin, when considering whether slaves could be
held in a trust by a Quaker, who refused to exercise any control over
them because of his religious beliefs." The plaintiffs questioned the
validity of a trust arrangement under which the defendants allowed
slaves virtual freedom.' Ruffin held that as long as the defendant held
the slaves in such a state of quasi-freedom, such an arrangement could
not be upheld by the court because "slaves can only be held as property,
and deeds and wills, having for their object their emancipation or a
qualified state of slavery are against public policy." 82 As a result of an
1830 statute which made it lawful for slaves to be bequeathed for the
purpose of emancipation and removal from the state, Ruffin gave the
defendant two choices: either remove the slaves from the state and grant
them freedom or keep them in North Carolina and exercise greater
authority over them.
In either scenario, one can see that Ruffin's
perception of the public good for the state would have been served.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 140.
JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, SLAVERY IN THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

30 (1899).

Id.
See Lemmond, 41 N.C. at 143.
See Thompson v. Newlin, 43 N.C. (8 Ired. Eq.) 32, 33 (1851).
Id.
Thompson v. Newlin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 341 (1844).
Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/3

12

Meyer: Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 182

SLAVERY JURISPRUDENCE

2011]1

325

Either the slaves would be enslaved within the state or they would be
removed as freedmen and North Carolina would be rid of a potential
problem.
Gaston had a markedly different perspective on manumission.
Although in 1841, in Cameron v. Commissioners, he seemingly agreed
with Ruffin that the public policy of North Carolina prohibited
manumitted slaves from staying in state (as required by statute),"
Gaston allowed the manumission of slaves resulting from a will which
Even more
specified for their relocation to the Colony of Liberia.
noteworthy was the way Gaston construed a statute in favor of the
prospective beneficiaries. The plaintiffs had argued that only proceeds
used for the actual removal of the freed slaves could be conveyed to the
slaves. 86 This result would have disallowed devisal of any sum used for
their resettlement (such as costs for housing, clothing and the like).
However, in addition to giving the slaves their freedom, the testator
also provided that some property be sold for their benefit in their resettlement. Under then-current trusts and estates law, slaves were
unable to obtain a beneficial interest in property devised to them unless
it was for a "charitable purpose."" Gaston held that not only were the
removal costs of emancipated slaves within the confines of such a
charitable purpose, but so were the costs of resettlement.88 Thus, the
slaves were deemed to have legal entitlement to receive the money
devised to them beyond the mere costs of relocating them to Liberia.
Skeptics may argue that the impact of this decision was minimal. Yet
when viewed in connection with Gaston's other opinions, one continues
to see a clear pattern: Gaston checked the advance of a more stringent
slave policy and perhaps even provided some clarifications that
augmented the legal status of slaves.
V.

CRACKS IN RUFFIN'S PRO-SLAVERY IDEOLOGY?

Not every decision rendered by Ruffin was prima facie contrary to
the interests of slaves. In some cases Ruffin arguably improved the legal
status of slaves. However, he did so only when there was absolutely no
84. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAw, 1619-1860 372 (1996).
85. See Cameron v. Comm'rs, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 436, 438 (1841). ("[The] Colony
of Liberia . . . [was] a colony under the control and patronage of the American
Colonization Society.")
86. Id. at 440.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 440-41.
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conceivable threat to the institution of slavery. For example, in Cox v.
Williams, Ruffin allowed slaves designated for removal to Liberia by will
to choose either emancipation followed by immediate removal to Africa
or to remain in slavery in North Carolina-with no middle ground."
The plaintiff, executor of the testatrix's will, instituted a bill so the court
could decide whether the deceased's slaves would pass to the testatrix's
next of kin or the American Colonization Society.9 0 The next-of-kin
defendant had contended that the devisal of slaves to the American
Colonization society was against North Carolina law and therefore
invalid.9'
Ruffin, in allowing slaves to make this circumscribed choice, may
have recognized that slaves were at least rational beings and capable of
making complex decisions, which was a grudging recognition by him of
their inherent capabilities. Certainly, Ruffin felt that permitting the
ability to make such a choice was an enhancement to the status of slaves.
He echoed this sentiment in one of his last opinions when he said that
slaves "are responsible human beings, having intelligence to know right
from wrong, and perceptions of pleasure and pain, and of the difference
between bondage and freedom, and thus, by nature, they are competent
to give or withhold their assent to things that concern their state." But
again, these opinions can easily be reconciled with Ruffin's emphasis on
public safety. The slaves would either be free in Liberia, or they would
be enslaved in North Carolina-in no way would either of these
outcomes undermine the foundation of slavery at home, Ruffin's
preeminent concern.
Ruffin's approach left little gray area for
interpretation or judicial maneuvering.
Another instance, which on its face seems inconsistent with Ruffin's
advocacy of a slaveholder's absolute authority, came in State v. Charity,
when the court considered whether a master's testimony could be used
against a slave. 93 The prosecution insisted that the provision of such
testimony in a murder trial was not prohibited by legal precedent which
forbade interested parties from providing testimony in civil suits.94
Ruffin held that the analogy to the rule in civil lawsuits was controlling

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Cox v. Williams, 39 N.C. (4 Ired. Eq.) 15, 19 (1845).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Redding v. Findley, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 216, 219 (1858).
See State v. Charity, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 543 (1830).
Id.
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for criminal trials." Therefore, the master's testimony, which the state
attorney general desired to admit over the master's protest for the
purpose of corroborating a confession to murder, was inadmissible
because the law did not permit testimony from people with an interest in
the outcome of a civil judicial proceeding." This decision arguably
improved the legal status of slaves. However, the net effect of this
outcome cannot be considered better than neutral from the slaves'
perspective.
Although the testimony in question was alleged to have
corroborated the slave's guilt, one can easily imagine many more cases
where this rule of automatic exclusion would have been detrimental to
slaves. For example, Ruffin's absolute bar of such testimony would also
disallow the testimony of a master who wished to testify on behalf of his
slave-even if for no other reason than to protect his property interest."
If more slaves would be helped by their master's testimony than would
be harmed, Ruffin likely concluded that the public interest in protecting
the institution of slavery was better served by disallowing the testimony
of all masters. This would have resulted in more "guilty" slaves being put
into jail; thereby preventing them from causing further social unrest
within North Carolinian society, which is consistent with Ruffin's usual
public policy analysis."
In another opinion, Waddill v. Martin, Ruffin upheld slaves'
property rights to a patch of cotton that their master had allowed them
to plant for their own profit." After their master died, his widow, who
was the co-executrix of his estate, refused to remit the profits of this
patch to the slaves.1 oo The plaintiff executor claimed a credit from the
estate for the amount paid to the slaves for the proceeds of their cotton
95. Id. at 544-45.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 545. It is true that slaveholders might have been indifferent to the
outcomes of murder trials because masters were fully compensated for the value of
executed slaves. However, in the vast majority of criminal trials-those for non-capital
crimes-the owners received no compensation and hence would have had at least a
financial interest in having their slaves exonerated.
98. See supra text accompanying note 45.
99. Waddill v. Martin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 562, 563-65 (1845). Interestingly,
Ruffin did not cite any precedent in his argument. Rather, it seems to have been a case
of first impression. While there do not seem to be cases in other jurisdictions that deal
with this precise issue, there was a later opinion in North Carolina which cited Waddill
approvingly for this point of law. See Washington v. Emery, 57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 32, 37
(1858).
100. Waddill, 38 N.C. (3 Ired Eq.) at 562-63.
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patch.' The defendant executrix claimed such an arrangement was not
legally enforceable.'
Ruffin held that the slaves' agreement with their
master was legally binding and that they were entitled to the profits
derived after the costs of selling were subtracted. 103 Seeming particularly
reproachful toward the testator's primary heirs, he noted that "we have
never known or heard of an attempt hitherto, to charge an executor in
favor of a legatee or even creditor, with the little crops of cotton, corn,
potatoes, ground peas and the like, made by slaves by permission of their
deceased owners."1'4
It cannot be disputed that this decision minimally improved the
legal status of slaves. However, its impact was dubious for two reasons.
First, only the master's consent could have rendered this type of
agreement binding.' 5 Far from increasing the rights of slaves, this
holding further solidified the dominant position of the master over the
slave. Although Ruffin's decision gave slaves increased property rights
by legally sanctioning the recognition of a customary right, one must
remember that such enforcement only came against the master's heirs,
not the slaveholder himself.'0 6 As a result, the institution of slavery
could not have been eroded by this opinion. The master's control was
still absolute and slaves could only garner further legal rights through a
master's consent, which presumably was subject to revocation at the
pleasure of the master-just not by those legally bound to carry out
legal duties attributed to the consenting master. 10'
Second, Ruffin hints at the apparent universal acceptance of such an
arrangement when he says that there is a "sense pervading the whole
community, of the utility, nay, unavoidable necessity of leaving to the
slave some small perquisites."'0
While Ruffin's opinion arguably
expanded this custom between master and slave to allow for the
enforcement of such custom against white heirs who otherwise would
have owned the crops, it is highly likely that he did not rule this way in
an effort to act in a beneficent manner toward slaves. Rather, he likely
viewed the impact on the institution of slavery as inconsequential

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 563.
Id.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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because North Carolinians were already operating under the assumption
that these pacts with slaves were acceptable and enforceable.
Accordingly, the state's citizens would most likely neither have been
surprised nor upset as there would have been little possible detriment to
North Carolina society.
Ruffin certainly issued a number of opinions that recognized an
increased sense of humanity toward slaves.'
However, it is
questionable whether any of these decisions added meaningful value to
the legal status of slaves. For instance, in Cannon v. Jenkins, Ruffin
rejected a stricter standard of scrutiny for investigating the general rule
that slaves must be sold for the highest price (typically gained by
individual auction) to uphold the combined sale of four brothers.' The
plaintiffs had argued that the slaves in question should have been sold
independently because such a sale might have led to a higher price."
Ruffin showed atypical compassion to the plight of slaves when he said
that "the [clourt would not punish [the executor] for acting on the
common sympathies of our nature unless in so doing he hath plainly
injured those with whose interest he stands charged."" 2
Yet this decision did not improve the status of slaves or dispel any
notions about Ruffin's harsh disposition toward slaves for two reasons.
First, Ruffin certainly did not require an executor to take action that
would be consistent with interests of humanity-even if reasonably
fiscally prudent." 3 Rather, he just allowed it at the discretion of the
executor."' Second, the opinion was. consistent with Ruffin's line of
reasoning-individually benevolent decisions were possible only if the
general rule derived would not weaken the institution of slavery.
Because slaves did not gain any additional rights or status as a result of
this decision, it did not adversely affect the public interest. Moreover,
this decision exemplified Ruffin's emphasis on both slaveholders' rights
and public safety. Consequently, improvement to the legal status of
slaves was still subject to two conditions: a master's consent and
thorough public policy analysis.

109. See, e.g., Waddill v. Martin, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 562, 563-65 (1845); State v.
Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500 (1839); Cannon v. Jenkins, 16 N.C. (1 Dev.
Eq.) 422 (1830).
110. Cannon, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 422.
111. Id. at424.
112. Id. at 426.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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Although Ruffin acknowledged slaves' capacity to make decisions
regarding the choice between accepting freedom and continued
servitude, in an 1840 case, White v. Green, he ruled that they were
unable to inherit property via a will.115 The plaintiff, John White, argued
successfully that he had acquired a legal interest in a life estate that had
been granted to the deceased's niece.116 Moreover, the plaintiff claimed,
in opposition to the defendant executors, that such life estate included
two slaves whose manumission had been provided for in the will.'"
Striking a provision that expressed the testator's intent to emancipate
two of his slaves and provide them with a parcel of land, Ruffin
reasoned, citing precedent," 8 that "[silaves have not capacity to take by
will, and a legacy to them, is like the direction for their emancipation,
void.""' This decision not only inhibited the ability of slaves to gain
their emancipation, but also indirectly degraded the rights of slaves
granted freedom through a will because it curtailed their ability to obtain
property (if only through a will).'
Again, one continues to see a decision-maker focused on solidifying
the rights of the slaveholder at the expense of the slaves' legal status-all
apparently in the name of the "public good." Ruffin rejected a more
flexible policy that might have allowed slaves to receive property more
easily under different circumstances.
VI. FREE BLACKS: LIBERTY IN NORTH CAROLINA?
The differences between Ruffin and Gaston on the issues of slavery
and race extended to the treatment of freedmen. In one of his more
historic opinions, State v. Manuel, Gaston upheld the constitutionality of
a North Carolina law which required the sheriff to hire free blacks who
had been convicted of crimes and were unable to pay resulting fines.' 2 '
The defendant claimed that the law was unconstitutional because it
forced servitude on free blacks."' At first glance, this decision seems
contrary to Gaston's efforts to mitigate the inhumane effects of laws
115. White v. Green, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 45 (1840).
116. Id. at 48-49.
117. Id. at 49.
118. Id. at 49 (citing Pendleton v. Blount, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 491 (1837);
Sorrey v. Bright, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 113 (1835)).
119. Id. at 49.
120. See White, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) at 45.
121. See State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 144, 164 (1838).
122. Id. at 149.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol33/iss2/3

18

Meyer: Slavery Jurisprudence on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 182

2011]1

SLAVERY JURISPRUDENCE

331

affecting blacks. However, Gaston still managed to elevate the legal
status of slaves and former slaves because he also concluded that
manumitted slaves born in North Carolina were citizens of the state.'
This was a meaningful improvement to the legal status of freed blacks.
Gaston's position, while not revolutionary, was extremely
pragmatic. He likely recognized the probability that a decision which
both struck down a law unfavorable to free blacks and also declared
them to be citizens was too radical for the moderate North Carolina
citizenry to accept. The import of Gaston's conclusion in this case was
made clear by the Dred Scott decision, which denied slaves the privilege
of American citizenship, regardless of whether any individual state
granted citizenship.' 24 In fact, Justice Curtis' dissent cites Gaston's
opinion, the only supporting judicial opinion cited for the proposition
that manumitted slaves became citizens of the state in which they were
manumitted.2 5
By contrast, Ruffin frequently ruled against the interests of
freedmen. For example, his opinion in Mayho v. Sears set out the
proposition that a deed providing for the emancipation of a woman slave
did not consequently also give freedom to her children born before the
date that her emancipation became effective.' 26 This case arose from a
rather simple trespass dispute. The plaintiff, a former slave, claimed title
to the disputed tract of land and argued that he had been granted
manumission by a deed which gave liberty to his mother in futuro many
years earlier."' Although Virginia law, under which the deed in this
case was made, allowed for such emancipation in futuro, Ruffin still
found a way to deny rights to freed blacks-by denying freedom to their
children born while they were still enslaved.2 8 This decision was
entirely consistent with his perception of what the public interest
demanded: to keep the population of free blacks in North Carolina at a
minimum. Although Ruffin does not admit to this underlying rationale,
it does seem consistent with his thinking.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 151.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Id. (Curtis, J., dissenting).
See Mayho v. Sears, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 224 (1842).
Id.
128. Id. at 227.
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VII. ATTITUDES TO SLAVERY AWAY FROM THE BENCH
Not surprisingly, the personal attitudes of Ruffin and Gaston
toward slavery were congruent with the positions they expressed on the
bench. Not only did Ruffin feel that slavery was beneficial for the white
masters who ruled the slaves, but he felt that the institution of slavery
was good for the slaves themselves. 2 9 Noting the protections afforded
by state statutes, the owners' economic interest in protecting valuable
personal property, and the pariah status that befell a cruel owner in the
eyes of a reproachful society, Ruffin went on to offer Haiti as a striking
example of what would happen if slaves were to be left to their natural
state.'30 "[Slaves'] fate would soon be that of our native savages or the
enfranchised blacks of the West Indies, the miserable victims of idleness,
want, drunkenness, and other debaucheries."' 3 1 Moreover, he added,
'[s]lavery in America has not only done more for the civilization and
enjoyments of the African race . .. but it has brought more of them into

the Christian fold than all the missions to the benighted continent from
the Advent to this day have."' 32 Far from leaving blacks in a degraded
condition, Ruffin argued that the authoritarian nature of southern
slavery was in fact beneficial for slaves. Rather than dealing with
criticism directed at slaveholders cautiously, Ruffin defended positions
that left little room for compromise.
Ruffin and Gaston apparently were in fundamental disagreement
about the economics underlying slavery. In 1855, in his annual address
as president of the State Agricultural Society of North Carolina, Ruffin
touted the economic benefits of slavery-both locally and nationally.13 3
One argument frequently made by anti-slavery advocates was that
slavery had a deleterious effect on free white labor. 33 Ruffin denied any
such effect, declaring that 'there is not a country on earth in which
honest labor and diligence in business in all classes and conditions is
Ruffin bolstered this
considered more respectable or more respected.""
argument with broad generalizations about the support for slavery in
North Carolina saying, "'There is an unanimous conviction of our people
129. HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 152-53.
130. MORRIS, supra note 84, at 191.
131. Id.
132. HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 153.
133. Julius Yanuck, Thomas Ruffin and North Carolina Slave Law, 21 J. S. LEGAL HIST.
456,457 (1955).
134. HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 152.
135. Id.
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that slavery as it exists here, is neither unprofitable, nor impolitic, nor
unwholesome."'3
Gaston frequently expressed very different views than Ruffin.
Gaston thought that the character of slavery in North Carolina was as
benign as it could be, reflecting that '[ilt is difficult to imagine a state of
slavery to exist more mitigated than that which prevails in North
Carolina . . . Slavery is regarded as an evil not to be removed, but as

This approach seems consistent with
susceptible to mitigation." 3
Gaston's jurisprudential aims of gradually improving the legal status of
slaves while moderating the institution of slavery itself. Realizing that
North Carolinian public opinion was favorable toward slavery, it is
possible that Gaston took a more moderate and restrained approach than
he might have had the public's attitude toward slavery been more
hostile. Had he attempted to take a less subtle approach and aimed for
more sweeping change, Gaston's efforts might have been rebuffed as too
radical by North Carolinians.
Gaston's most prominent criticism of slavery came in 1832 during a
speech to the Philanthropic and Dialectic Societies at the University of
North Carolina. 138 Whereas Ruffin felt that slavery was a boon for
southern prosperity, Gaston viewed it as blight upon southern society."'
Contradicting Ruffin's assertion that slavery stimulated the southern
economy, Gaston contended: "[Slavery] keeps us back in the career of
improvement. It stifles industry and suppresses enterprise; it is fatal to
economy and prudence; it discourages skill, impairs our strength as a
community, and poisons morals at the fountain head."'
Eschewing controversial pronouncements, Gaston sought to frame
his criticisms of slavery in a manner that would be palatable to southern
society. It is possible that Gaston relied on economic arguments because
any moral objection likely would have fallen on deaf ears as leading
religious denominations had essentially sanctioned slavery.14 ' While the
influence of churches over slavery was questionable, the simple fact that
they did not denounce slavery would have undercut any effort by Gaston
to characterize slavery as a moral or social evil, rather than an economic

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 153.
MORRIS, supra note 84, at 191.
See Gaston Address, supra note 20.
Id. at 14.
Id.
MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY

AND LITERATURE 56 (2003).
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one.
Gaston's economic argument exemplifies
pragmatic approach.

his consistently

VIII. SIGNIFICANT OR TRIVIAL DIFFERENCES?

Despite the perceived differences between them, there apparently
was minimal discord between the opinions of Ruffin and Gaston. 14 2
Similarly, other opinions of Gaston and Ruffin were not as sharply
contrasting as this Author has proposed. In fact, one rarely sees Ruffin
or Gaston directly criticizing the other's opinions. However, when
viewing the body of their work on slavery as a whole, one readily sees a
fundamental difference. Ruffin utilized a rigid public policy approach
reinforcing slavery. Gaston, on the other hand, employed a more
flexible approach that balanced a variety of factors and softened the
impact of stringent slavery reforms, improving the legal status of slaves.
Perhaps the reason for the seeming lack of discord between the two
justices can be explained by these congruent jurisprudential approaches.
It is plausible that Ruffin refrained from filing many opinions dissenting
from Gaston because he did not view the resolution of those cases as
having a noticeably detrimental impact on North Carolina's public
policy. It is similarly possible that Gaston did not directly criticize
Ruffin's opinions such as Mann because he realized the importance of
taking a politically practical position. Therefore, Gaston might have
placed emphasis on the gradual mitigation of slavery largely because he
felt that only such a rationale would be accepted by the populace.
Despite Gaston's consistent efforts to moderate slavery, at the time
of his death he owned two hundred slaves.' 4 3 Although he publicly
denounced the institution of slavery as economically corrosive, he
obviously found owning slaves acceptable. Moreover, his opinions make
clear that he did not believe in equality between whites and blacks; he
frequently made pronouncements, referring to the "difference of
condition between the white man and the slave-as recognized by our
legal institutions-and not the difference between personal merit and
demerit-which creates a legal distinction between the sufficiency and
insufficiency of the alleged provocation. 144

142. Patrick S. Brady, Slavery, Race, and the Criminal Law in Antebellum North
Carolina: A Reconsideration of the Thomas Ruffin Court, 10 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 248, 259
(1978-1979).
143. 8 HUEBNER, supra note 15, at 783.
144. State v. Jarrott, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 76, 83-84 (1840).
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IX. MOTIVATIONS

It is difficult to understand why two men who superficially seemed
so similar applied markedly different approaches to dealing with slavery.
Particularly difficult to comprehend is why Gaston became instrumental
in providing slaves increased protections, unlike Ruffin. There are
several factors which seem relevant: differences in politics, religion,
morality and judicial decision-making philosophy.
Although Gaston's political roots lay with the Federalist and Whig
parties while Ruffin's rested in the Jeffersonian Republican and
Democratic parties, simple political affiliation is not very insightful for
the purpose of differentiating their judicial views. After all, the
overwhelming majority of North Carolinians-irrespective of their
political affiliation-were in favor of implementing more rigid
protections into the state's system of slavery.' 45 Thus, it is unlikely that
the root of Gaston's efforts to ameliorate the harshest edges of slavery
was driven by a widespread state or local political ideology. Moreover,
Gaston and Ruffin had remarkably similar experiences in state politics,
both rising to the prominent leadership post of speaker of the House of
Commons. However, there was one major difference in their political
experiences which may be more telling: Gaston's relatively broad
exposure to national politics. Whereas Ruffin only had local political
experience focusing on issues of state importance while operating within
the North Carolina legislature, Gaston's service in Congress between
1813 and 1817 (which included a significant portion of the War of
1812), in addition to his state service, likely gave him a broader
perspective on the specter of the impending sectional crisis.14 6
It is clear that Gaston sensed the potential catastrophe that a largescale conflict could bring to the South. In the same 1832 speech in
which he denounced slavery as an economic peril, he also emphasized
his concern about the dangers of sectionalism: "Now then has come that
period, foreseen and dreaded by our WASHINGTON ... who with a
father's warning-voice bade us beware of 'parties founded on
geographical discriminations.

It is likely that Gaston's national

experience led him to foresee the dangers of a sectional crisis tied to the
145. BASSETT, supra note 77, at 7.
146. 3 CONNOR, supra note 13, at 41 ("When ... Mr. Gaston was a member of
Congress, he opposed the War of 1812. Charged by his opponents with want of
patriotism, he retorted: 'I was baptised [sic] an American in the blood of a murdered
father."').
147. Gaston Address, supra note 20, at 14-15.
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southern trend toward making slavery a more rigid and inhumane
institution. Although an immediate ban on slavery would not have been
politically feasible, Gaston's policy of gradually mitigating the excesses
of slavery likely reflects a national perspective on the political
divisiveness created by the peculiar institution.
Ruffin, by contrast, lacked this national perspective. As a state
representative, he would have been in tune with the issues important to
North Carolinians, but was probably less attuned to the national
landscape-and slavery's position within that landscape. However,
Ruffin clearly had keen political acumen.
As Timothy Huebner
observes, "Ruffin displayed a clear understanding of the political
circumstances surrounding legal issues as well as a keen ability to craft
his opinions to resolve social and political tensions."'
Yet it was not
until he became involved in the Washington Peace Conference in 1861
that he played a genuine national role.149 Whereas Gaston had served in
Congress in an era that fostered compromise, by the time Ruffin
attended the peace conference, sectional reconciliation was impossible.
Moreover, Ruffin was a partisan politician. For instance, Huebner
notes that "Ruffin devoted nearly as much of his life to partisan
It is
politics-a fact that influenced his judicial decision making."'
plausible that as a result of his extensive partisan experience, Ruffin may
have been more concerned with espousing a rigid point of view rather
than working towards an effective compromise. Therefore, because he
believed that the South was constitutionally entitled to maintain slavery
in perpetuity, he largely refused compromise.
To be sure, Gaston too had been intimately involved in partisan
politics. Furthermore, his ownership of slaves shows that he was not
anti-slavery in his actions. However, Gaston's exposure to a national
political forum in which compromise was essential likely led him to
adopt a more cautious approach in dealing with fractious issues. One
can speculate that in order to balance adequately competing core social,
economic, as well as public policy considerations, Gaston had to adopt a
more flexible approach. Gaston's cautious yet deliberate method was
essential in allowing him to strike a compromise between forestalling
national crisis while also allaying southerners' fears about the threat that
increasingly lax measures of authority might pose.

148. HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 131.
149. Id. at 131, 155.
150. Id. at 131.
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Another crucial difference that separated them was religion.
Perhaps because Gaston belonged 'to a minority faith, he probably
defended more minority causes than any man of his day."" 5' Gaston's
Catholic faith likely gave him an outsider's perspective in an
overwhelmingly Protestant culture. Gaston's faith clearly was a hardship
to him at times in public life. In fact, it almost kept him off the supreme
court. When considering whether to pursue election to the court,
Gaston was concerned about a provision in the North Carolina
Constitution which mandated that only those who "believeld] in the
truths of the Protestant religion"'5 2 could hold state office.
The opposition to Catholics' service in government was real. For
instance, one prominent lawyer, Henry Seawell, expressed his concern
that 'the integrity of the Protestant religion would be seriously affected
by Gaston's election to the bench.""5 " After consulting with both Ruffin
and United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, Gaston
became convinced that the provision did not bar him from service on the
Yet his discomfort with this provision was a primary catalyst
court.'
behind his impassioned efforts towards amending the state's
constitution. At the 1835 Constitutional Convention, he succeeded in a
strenuous campaign to have the word "Protestant" replaced by
"Christian." 55
Just as relevant for an inquiry into Gaston's personal motivations
was that at this same convention, he also staunchly opposed, although
unsuccessfully, an amendment which "deprived the free negroes of the
right to vote." 56 It is plausible that his experience as a member of a
minority group made him less willing to assume that the defense of the
established order was a necessary good. Hence, it may not be surprising
that Gaston used his position on the court to take a more balanced
approach on issues concerning minority interests, such as the legal
status of slaves and free blacks. Moreover, it is possible that Gaston's
minority faith led him to give greater weight to social considerations,
particularly human rights.

151. SCHAUINGER, supra note 29, at 117 (quoting BRYCE R. HOLT, THE SUPREME COURT
OF NORTH CAROLINA AND SLAVERY 22 (1926)).
152. Id. at 102.
153. Id. at 105 (quoting Swain to Gaston, Nov. 8 1933, Gaston MSS).

154. Id. at 102-03.
155. 3 CONNOR, supra note 13, at 76.
156. Id. at 75.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3

338

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:313

Ruffin had a very different religious background. Ruffin was
actively involved in the Episcopal Church, serving as a delegate to the
General Convention on several occasions."'7 As a Protestant, wealthy,
slaveholding, white male he had a strong incentive to maintain the status
quo.
One could argue that religion was a negligible factor in either
justice's jurisprudence and that any apparent links between Gaston's
faith and advocacy of minority causes was little more than mere
coincidence. It is not clear that Ruffin's Protestant beliefs played a
significant role in his opinions. However, Gaston's vigorous attempt to
protect both religious and racial minorities while attending the
Convention of 1835 is strong tangible evidence of a link between
Gaston's religious faith and his attempts to mitigate the institution of
slavery. Thus, religion may be more critical to understanding Gaston's
approach than Ruffin's. However, religion alone can hardly explain
Gaston's jurisprudence.
X.

JUDICIAL AIMs

One factor that may shed additional light on the differences
between Gaston and Ruffin is their aim in judicial decision-making.
Gaston perhaps was driven by the motive of attaining justice for
individuals. This required balancing numerous social, economic and
public policy considerations. For instance, in one 1833 decision
unrelated to slavery, Gaston declared that the judicial resolution of
conflicts must be guided by "[jIustice, which it is the first object of every
well regulated society to establish, and the repose of the community, an
In attempting to carve
object second only in importance to justice."'
out an improved legal status for slaves, Gaston aimed to achieve
maximum justice for slaves as the legal system would allow-while at
the same time staying within what he thought were defined judicial
bounds. He alluded to this when outlining another decision, saying that
"[olne of the duties of judges is to hand down the deposit of the law, as
they have received it, without addition, diminution, or change."5 9
Hence, in order to stay within the guidelines prescribed by legal
precedent, it was necessary that Gaston use a cautious methodology that

157. 19 THOMAS D. MORRIS, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 45 (1999).

158. Craven v. Craven, 17 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 338, 347 (1833).
159. State v. Miller, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 526 (1836).
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dealt with issues of slavery not in black and white but rather in
amorphous shades of gray.
While Gaston focused more on achieving justice based on casespecific facts while balancing a variety of interests, Ruffin was influenced
much more by his "political and policy-making endeavors."160 Therefore,
he frequently rejected what he may have believed to be the "just"
outcome based on the specific facts of cases in favor of either strict
adherence to stated law or his impression of what strong state public
policy necessitated. One instance of this was in Mann, when at the
outset he claimed to be troubled by the tension between "the feelings of
the man, and the duty of the magistrate."16 ' Ruffin focused on the
broader policy implications of a decision curtailing a bailee's rights to
punish slaves, rather than legal precedent, humane or moral
considerations. By contrast, while Gaston's decisions certainly had an
important impact on policy, his decisions were not rigidly guided by
these considerations, but rather were primarily guided by achieving his
notion of justice in the individual case. For Ruffin, justice seemed to
revolve more around adherence to overarching, coherent themes.
Thomas Ruffin and William Gaston were similar men who came to
very different conclusions about the most important political, economic
and moral issue of their time. Ultimately, it is possible to understand
and characterize the differences between them, but one cannot know for
certain what caused the divergence in their approaches. A number of
factors, however, are suggestive. It was likely that differences in their
religious faith and political experience, in addition to their judicial aims,
led to their sharply divergent views, rather than moral or altruistic
reservations about the institution of slavery. Gaston's minority Catholic
faith in addition to his national political experience likely made him
more sensitive to the issue of legal status and seemingly less disposed to
take for granted the views of the predominant majority. His national
role also seemed to make him sensitive to the importance of working
toward national compromise on slavery. Ruffin, as an elite southern
planter, took the more prevalent and politically popular position that
slavery was a guaranteed right of the South and that on behalf of social
order it was necessary that masters have increasingly absolute power
over their slaves. However, it was this type of uncompromising thinking
that made slavery so repressive and reflected the hardening of attitudes
which ultimately helped to precipitate the Civil War.
160. See HUEBNER, supra note 6, at 131.
161. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 264 (1829).
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